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Community choice is a very important household decision since it represents an
investment in community attributes that can have a significant impact on the quality of life of
all household members, particularly influencing the future prospects of children. In this
paper, 1990 Census data are used to rank communities in Los Angeles County. We study the
community choice of new migrants and find that controlling for income, black and Hispanic
households consume significantly less in community attributes. Potential explanations for this
gap are explored.
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I. Introduction
Community choice represents a household investment having significant impacts on the
quality of life of household members, particularly on the future prospects of children. While
there is no precise definition of community, there is general agreement on some of the
essential attributes that determine community quality. Certain neighborhoods have lower
crime, higher quality schools, cleaner air, or a shorter commute to the CBD, and there is a
substantial empirical literature that suggests that households pay for these attributes through
the housing market (Oates (1969), Smith and Huang (1995)).
In addition, there is considerable variation in the characteristics of neighbors across
location. There is growing empirical evidence that neighbors matter in determining outcomes
that our society views as bad or good. For example, Case and Katz (1991) find that,
controlling for a host of individual characteristics, neighbor attributes have an impact on the
probability of committing a crime, illegal drug use, alcohol abuse, and church attendance.
Haveman and Wolfe (1994) find that as a neighborhood's average percentage of youths who
are high school dropouts increases, a youth's probability of graduating from high school falls,
as does educational attainment level. Holzer (1988) shows that friends are a key source of
information about job opportunities, which might explain some of the concentration of ethnic
groups in certain occupations. Borjas (1995) shows that the socioeconomic performance of
today's workers depends not only on the skills of parents but also on the average skills of the
ethnic group in the parents' generation.
In this paper, we examine neighborhood choice by households in Los Angeles County
using the 5% sample of the 1990 Census Public Use Micro Sample (PUMS). The 1990 PUMS
provides geographical information that divides Los Angeles County into 58 "communities" we
exploit in this study. We use this geographic information to examine community choice by
households that have moved into a community in the previous five years. We believe that
recent movers are the appropriate unit of analysis since they take community attributes and
prices as given and face high moving costs which provide a strong incentive to choose the
right location.
We begin our analysis by employing the methods developed in the inter-city quality of
life literature (Blomquist et al. (1988), Gyourko and Tracy (1991)) to estimate expenditures in
dollars on quality of life for each of the 58 communities in Los Angeles County. For our
estimates, community quality of life is measured by school quality, air quality, crime,
accessibility to the central city, and the average educational attainment of community
residents. We estimate a standard hedonic regression with housing structure characteristics
and community attributes as the independent variables. Using the coefficients on our
community attributes, we calculate the total expenditures on these attributes for each of the 58
communities, which provides a cardinal metric to rank communities. There is considerable
variation in these expenditures across these communities.
The main contribution of this paper is that we use the quality of life expenditures to
examine households that moved in the previous five years to see how expenditures on
community quality vary with respect to household income. Controlling for income, we find
surprisingly large differences across racial groups, with whites spending significantly more on
quality of life than blacks or Hispanics. As expected, we find that as income rises a lower
percentage of whites, blacks and Hispanics move into the worst communities and a larger
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percentage moves into the nicest communities. However, the percentage of blacks and
Hispanics moving into the best communities is considerably smaller than that of whites with
similar incomes. To the extent that these neighborhood attributes are important determinants
of the future prospects of children, these results suggest that today's minority children will
face more limited opportunities in adulthood than their majority counterparts.
Why is the community expenditure gap so large across racial groups? We consider
three explanations but our evidence does not provide a clear story. First, our results are
consistent with the presence of housing market discrimination. While we have no explicit
measure of discrimination in this study, the differences in community expenditures by race
may indicate a lack of access to these communities. Second, permanent not annual income
may determine community expenditures by race. If white households have higher permanent
income then we would expect them to make larger investments in community attributes. Since
the Census is cross-section rather than panel data, it does not provide the ideal base for
studying this question. However, the evidence that we do have suggests that permanent
income differences would not fully explain our expenditure results. Third, the expenditure
gap may simply reflect differences in preferences by race. For example, commitment to
certain communities might outweigh the increase in quality of other community attributes even
as income rises. We estimate a conditional logit model which is the standard test for
differences in preferences. Our results reject the hypothesis that preferences for our
community attributes are the same across racial groups. However, examining the coefficients
on individual attributes does indicate that preferences are similar for some of the individual
attributes. We must be cautious in interpreting the conditional logit results since this model
assumes equal access to each of the choices. If access is limited for some households due to
housing market discrimination, then the results cannot be interpreted as preference differences.
In summary, we find surprisingly large differences in community expenditures across
racial groups. Whether these differences in expenditures result from discrimination blocking
access of minorities to certain communities or from preferences to live with other members of
the same race, they represent large differences in neighborhood investments which can
significantly impact the future prospects of minority children.
In the next section of this paper, we outline a theoretical framework to shape the
empirical work presented in this paper. In Section III, we sketch our empirical methodology;
in Section IV, we present the data on households and the characteristics of the communities
that they live in. The results from our hedonic regressions and our estimates of community
expenditures by race controlling for income are presented in Section V along with an
investigation of potential explanations of the expenditure gap. Finally, in Section VI, we draw
our conclusions from this analysis.
II. Expenditures on Neighborhood Amenities
Neighborhood choice represents an investment in a public good that provides utility for
each family member and is an input in the production of child quality (Becker (1993), p. 184).
Neighborhood characteristics are capitalized into local land prices. Neighborhoods with less
crime, better schools, high human capital neighbors and low pollution will cost more to live
in. Taking the land gradient as given, each family chooses the neighborhood that maximizes
its utility. Community choice is a function of the price of each community, the bundle of
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goods and services offered by each community, and the availability and quality of information
that households can access.
When a family invests in living in a nice neighborhood, they are forgoing private
consumption for increased investment in their safety, health, and human capital. There may
be a conflict between the parent's optimal expenditures on community and the child's optimal
level of community inputs. In other words, the parents' utility maximization problem is not
necessarily equivalent to maximizing child quality. Our model adds an agency problem to the
standard public goods model. From the parents' perspective, neighborhood quality may be a
substitute for parents' time or for market investments in activities such as private tutoring.1
From the child's standpoint, there may be few real substitutes for our community attributes.
While private schools and tutoring may be a substitute for poor local schools, for many
children these are not an option given the family budget constraint.
To formalize this discussion using a simple time allocation model, assume that there
are two parents (labeled as 1 and 2) who gain utility from their private consumption, C,
community quality, Z, and child quality, Q. The parents must choose how to allocate their
scarce time between working, L, at wage, W, and devoting time to their child, T. Family
income can be spent on either the parents' or the child's private consumption or on community
quality. Because of hedonic bundling, a community's price is a non-linear function of
1
 In the education literature, researchers have found evidence that families substitute higher school
quality inputs when mothers have higher labor force participation rates. Flyer and Rosen (1994) find
that the elasticity of substitution between the stock of teachers per student and female labor force
participation rates is about 0.5 (i.e., a 1 % increase in female labor force participation rates increases
the teacher stock by 0.5%).
community attributes, P(Z). Child quality is an increasing function of parental inputs, private
consumption, Cc, and community quality. Both community and child quality are family public
goods. A married couple who pools working income would choose their optimal community
based on:
max U(CltZ,Q) + U(C2,Z,Q) (1)
Wl*L1 + W2*L2 = C1 + C2 + Cc + P(Z) (2)
subject to:
1 =T,+L{ (3)
1 = V L 2 (4)
Q =f(TvT1Xc,Z) (5)
The first order conditions to maximize the parents' utility with respect to labor supply
and private consumption are standard. The more interesting public goods condition is the first
order condition with respect to community choice.
U\ZX) + U'(Z2) + {U'iQJ + U'{Q2))*f'{Z) = P'(Z) (6)
The family's total marginal utility from increasing neighborhood quality is the sum of parents
1 and 2's private marginal utility from community, plus the marginal impact of community on
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the child's quality multiplied by the marginal utility the parents enjoy from increased child
quality. The right hand side indicates that the marginal cost of an extra increment of
community is not a constant.
Consider an increase in wages. If community amenities are normal goods, then the
income effect increases demand for community. As wages rise, however, parents will have an
incentive to substitute work for family time. To the extent that neighborhood quality is a
substitute for family time in the production of child quality, the increase in wages will provide
an incentive for households to choose nicer neighborhoods.
Family structure has an important impact on family decision making. For example,
unlike the married couple, a single female head of household would maximize her utility
subject to her time constraint and budget constraint such that expenditures on her private
consumption and her child's private consumption plus the price of neighborhood quality does
not exceed her labor income plus any transfer from her child's father.2
It is difficult to compare a female head of household's community consumption versus
a married couple's because, holding family income constant, it is likely that the female head
has more disposable income but community represents a family public good for the married
couple and enters both of their utility functions. Single parents may view increased
neighborhood quality as a way of compensating, in part, for the absent parent and therefore
spend more on neighborhood quality.
2As analyzed in Weiss and Willis (1985), there may be an agency problem with divorced couples in
that the father is providing resources to his ex-wife with the expectation that these resources will be
spent on their children, but the husband cannot monitor his spouse to insure that the children are
enjoying this transfer. A female head of household who locates in a high quality community sends a
credible signal to her ex-spouse that she is making investments in their children.
In this model, we assume that the production of public amenities is exogenous. While
it is certainly true that a community's supply of public amenities is determined over time by
residents, much of the empirical work presented in this paper concerns the locational choice of
movers. It seems reasonable to assume that at any point in time these movers are a small
portion of the community's population and take the public amenities offered as given in
choosing their community.3
In this model, holding income constant, low investment in community attributes is
generated by parental preferences for private consumption.4 This model ignores other possible
explanations. There is an extensive urban literature which suggests that minorities do not have
equal access to all communities due to discrimination. Several authors have suggested that
access may be a problem because minorities incur substantially higher search costs than white
households to find similar housing in a given community (Yinger (1986, 1990), Turner
(1992)). The empirical work presented in this paper, as in any study that examines only
market outcomes such as the rents or prices paid for housing, cannot identify this increase in
search costs that may influence locational choice.
3
 Our model assumes myopic migrants as well as exogenous amenity production. A dynamic
model of how each community's supply of public goods evolves over time would have to wrestle with
both migrant and resident expectations concerning the future of the community. It is quite reasonable
to assume that community school quality, crime and neighborhood human capital levels depend on the
set of people who have chosen to live in the community. Over time, the stock of people in a
community is affected by the flow of migrants who enter and exit the community.
4
 In this model, we have considered the problem of maximizing the parents' utility. If, instead, we
consider maximizing child quality, Equation (5) becomes the objective function subject to Equations
(2), (3) and (4). In this case, the optimal community choice is when parents allocate no resources to
themselves and consume community attributes where the marginal benefit to child quality is equal to
the marginal cost of public amenities.
8
In this section, we have provided two reasons that households with similar incomes
might make different investments in community amenities: differences in preferences or
differences in access. In our Los Angeles data, we can track which of the 58 communities
within Los Angeles County are chosen by recent mover households. Maps 1 to 3 provide
evidence on locational choice by race. These maps show substantial differences: blacks are
considerably more spatially concentrated in the central city than whites or Hispanics. We get
very similar patterns if we consider just high income households. There is an extensive
literature which describes the patterns of segregation within urban America much the way
Maps 1 through 3 do for Los Angeles (see, for example, Massey and Denton (1993)). While
these descriptions of residential location patterns are useful, it is important to note that
knowing that people live in different communities does not necessarily mean that they are
consuming different community attributes. In order to conclude that investments in
community attributes vary by household, we need to know the extent to which one community
is a reasonable substitute for another. In this paper, we build a metric that permits us to
compare levels of community investments across households.
III. Empirical Methodology
The problem of studying household locational choice is complicated because there are a
large number of communities (58 communities in our work) to choose among that vary on
many dimensions and a large number of households who vary on many dimensions as well
(e.g., preferences, income, households size, age). The family chooses a community i which
maximizes its utility function which we assume is linear in community quality, Z, and private
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consumption, C, and e is an idiosyncratic shock:
IKQ.Z,) = (frZj + PQ + €S (7)
subject to the budget constraint:
I* = Q + P(zy (8)
where I is household income and P(Zj) is the hedonic gradient.
In our empirical work, we focus on the community choices of migrants within Los
Angeles County. We observe the characteristics of the household, their locational choice, the
set of attributes of the location they choose, and the rents they pay. Our goal is to quantify
investments in community attributes and compare those investments across racial groups and
household types. Our measure of community investment is household expenditures on
community attributes. If these groups face the same prices for community attributes then these
expenditure comparisons provide estimates of differences in quantities of community attributes
consumed.5
Given that communities vary across a large number of attributes, we need to weight
those attributes in order to create a single index of community quality. There is a long
literature which suggests that community attributes are capitalized into land values. The
standard approach to measuring the value of locational amenities is to estimate an hedonic
equation with rent or house prices as the dependent variable and structural and locational
5
 Expenditures are price times quantity but our focus here is on quantities of investment. If
minority households pay less per unit of community attributes than majority households and we observe
that total expenditures by minorities are lower than those for majority households, then expenditures
differentials do not necessarily translate into consumption differentials. If minority households pay
more per unit of community attributes and their total expenditures are lower than those of majority
households, then expenditures differentials provide a lower bound on investment differentials.
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attributes as the independent variables. The coefficients on the locational attributes serve as
index weights used to construct an index of expenditures on locational amenities.6
In the first stage of our empirical work, we estimate hedonic equations across all
households which yields implicit prices for our community attributes. There is extensive
literature dating back to Becker (1957) which suggests that in the presence of discrimination
minorities pay more for comparable housing. As a result, we also estimate our hedonic
models permitting different prices by race. If implicit prices vary by race then our index of
expenditures on community attributes will vary depending on the prices used. In order to
insure that our results are robust, we estimate expenditure indices using various estimates of
these index weights (implicit prices). In this analysis, we use explicit measures of community
amenities; we measure school quality, crime, air quality, human capital accumulation and
accessibility. The estimated hedonic takes the form:
P(Zp =log(renttJ) = constant + \\f X{ + y Zy + ey (9)
where rent is for household i in community j , X is a vector of structure characteristics for the
housing unit occupied by household i, and Z is a vector of community amenities.7 Equation
(9) is the first stage of the estimation procedure outlined in Rosen (1974) yielding what
6
 This procedure mimics the cross city quality of life literature (see Blomquist et. al (1988), and
Gyourko and Tracy (1991)).
7
 An alternative approach to estimating Equation (9) would be to run a model with the structure
variables and PUMA dummy variables rather than the PUMA-specific attributes (the Zs). While this
fixed effect model would yield estimates of expenditures, this approach does not explicitly measure the
prices of individual investment attributes which is one of our goals in this paper. As discussed below,
we estimate the fixed effect model and find that the community expenditures estimated using that model
are highly correlated with the expenditure estimates based on equation (9).
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households pay for a standard bundle of community attributes.
Using our estimates of the ys in Equation (9), we estimate expenditures on community
amenities for each of our 58 communities:
expenditures on community. = y**Z. (10)
Using these estimates, we examine expenditures on community by income, race, and family
type. This approach permits us to examine community investments by race and family type
holding income constant. Community expenditures provide a cardinal metric of differences in
community investments.
In this paper, we are interested in both expenditures and demand parameters. Demand
parameters are required to explain these differences in investments by race. Following
Quigley (1982), we impose more structure on the utility function by using the linear form in
Equation (7).8 Given the non-linear budget constraint, migrants choose the community that
maximizes their utility. Their location decisions identify their willingness to tradeoff
community attributes. Substituting Equation (8) into Equation (7), household i chooses
community j which maximize:
u(i ,Zj)= 4 ^ + pa - P(z j» + e8 ( i i )
Assuming e is distributed Weibull, the probability, pj5 that a person picks community j as a
function of the community attributes Zj defined in Equation (11):
8
 Following Rosen (1974), there is a long literature suggesting the Rosen two-step procedure to
recover demand parameters. Brown and Rosen (1982) and Epple (1987) show that demand parameters
are not identified in a single cross-section without imposing more structure on the problem.
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1 *-v ((j)Z,+fi(/-P(Z,)) \ **'
We estimate equation (12) as a 58 dimension conditional logit by race. The estimated results
can be used to explore the extent to which differences in expenditures can be explained by
differences in preferences. Using the coefficients in Equation (12), we estimate the marginal
rates of substitution by race. If these are close across racial groups, then we must look for
other explanations of the expenditure gap.
IV. Data Sources
In order to implement the methodology outlined above, we need micro data on
households and their housing choices to estimate the hedonic gradient. In addition, we need
data on migrants and the locations they choose. The 1990 Census of Population and Housing
5% Public Use Sample for Los Angeles County contains 150,338 households records. Home
prices and rents are self-reported. Home prices are top-coded at $400,000 while contract rent
is top-coded at $1,000. Renters also report their gross rent, which is not top-coded. As
shown in Table 1, on average, rental units have fewer rooms and bedrooms than owner-
occupied units. Average reported gross rent is $672 per month while average reported home
price is $243,484.
Each household in the sample resides in one of the Public Use Micro Areas (PUMAs).
These 58 areas represent our geographical variation within the city. In most cases, PUMA
boundaries were defined for the Census by state government. While PUMAs generally are
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number of hourly readings per year that ozone exceeded the Clean Air Act standard; as shown
in Table 1, on average, nearly 36 readings per year exceed the standard. Not surprisingly, the
ozone problem increases dramatically when moving inland away from the coast.
Our crime data are murders per thousand in population in 1990. As shown in Table 1,
on average, there was one murder per 10,000 people in 1990. For the city of Los Angeles,
we use data published by the Los Angeles Police Department on crimes by reporting district.
There are 18 reporting districts which we map onto the 21 PUMAs in the city. Outside of the
city, we aggregate crime data by cities and urban places to reflect the remaining 37 PUMAs;
these data are published by Los Angeles County.
As an estimate of accessibility, we measure the distance between the center of each of
the 57 PUMAs and the Civic Center in downtown Los Angeles, located in PUMA 6502.
Clearly, Los Angeles is a poor example of a monocentric city with its many employment
centers. However, the central city still has the largest share of the county's employment. As
a result, distance to the center seems a reasonable if somewhat crude estimate of accessibility.
In Table 1, we also present the correlation matrix for our PUMA-specific variables
including the racial composition of the PUMA. Note the high correlation between racial
composition and the other PUMA-specific variables such as percent college graduates, average
math scores, and the murder rate. We will return to these correlations as we interpret our
results throughout the rest of this paper.
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administered to all eighth graders in the state as part of the California Assessment Program
(CAP). Outside the city of Los Angeles we map school districts to PUMAs and average the
scores weighted by district enrollment. The city of Los Angeles is served by the Los Angeles
Unified School District. Since this is a large district with enrollment over 500,000 and there
is wide variation in the quality of schools within the district, using the district average score
for all 21 PUMAs in the city would be meaningless. As a result, we allocate all of the junior
high schools in the Los Angeles Unified School District to PUMAs by the address of the
school and average the test scores of the schools allocated to each PUMA weighted by school
enrollment. As shown in Map 4, there is considerable variation in these test scores across
PUMAs. As shown in Table 1, the average math score by PUMA is 248.2 with a standard
deviation 39.3.
As a proxy for neighborhood human capital, we use the percentage of a PUMA's adult
population that are college graduates. Recent empirical studies by Rauch (1993) and Borjas
(1995) indicate the gains from living near highly educated people. As shown in Table 1, on
average 20% of household heads within a PUMA are college graduates.
Air quality data is constructed from ozone data reported by the California
Environmental Protection Agency. Los Angeles has the worst ozone smog problem in the
nation.10 In 1990, there were 18 monitoring stations within Los Angeles County. We assign
each PUMA to the closest monitoring station. The ozone variable is a measurement of the
10
 Krupnick, Harrington and Ostro (1990) and Portney and Mullahy (1990) estimate health
production functions using micro data to control for individual smoking and report statistically
significant impact of ozone on respiratory diseases.
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Model 1 is the rental hedonic regression with the dependent variable the log of gross
rent which is the rent measure that is not top-coded. Locations have higher rents if they have
higher test scores, higher percentage of college graduates, lower ozone pollution, less crime or
are located outside the City of Los Angeles. Ozone, percent college graduate and math scores
are all statistically significant. Distance to the center of the City of Los Angeles has the wrong
sign but is statistically insignificant.
The coefficients in Model 1 are estimates of implicit prices of each of the attributes.
These estimates indicate that a 10 point increase in the math scores of local school children
increases rents by 0.7%. A 10 percentage point increase in a PUMA's college graduate
population increases rents by 9.2%. Ozone's coefficient indicates that a 10 day increase in
ozone exceedences lowers rents by 1.0%.14 Our coefficient on homicides indicate that an
increase of 1 murder per thousand people lowers rents by 20%. Surprisingly, homicides are
not statistically significant in the rent regression. The large standard errors may be due, in
part, to the fact that within the City of Los Angeles the crime reporting district boundaries are
quite different from the PUMA boundaries. The city dummy variable is negative, but
statistically insignificant; the coefficient indicates that rents in the city are -2.2% lower than
rents outside the city. Overall, this model explains 32.9% of the variation in gross rents.
While there is clearly considerable variation that is not explained in this model, our six
14
 Given that ozone exceedences increase considerably moving inland from the coast, we had some
concern that our air quality data may be serving as a proxy for temperature increases with respect to
increases in distance from the coast. Including average July temperature in our model did not
significantly change the air quality results but the correlation between July temperature and ozone is
roughly 0.6. In future research we will examine 1980 data when the Los Angeles ozone problem was
considerably worse.
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V. Estimation and Results
First Stage: Hedonic Estimates
We estimate Equation (9) for both rent and home prices. The independent variables,
X, are number of rooms, number of bedrooms, age of the unit, structure type, 6 PUMA
characteristics and a dummy variable for rent control.11 Unfortunately, the Census is quite
limited in terms of data on the standard attributes of the house. For example, there is no
information on the number of bathrooms or the size of the unit in square feet.12
As discussed above, we use explicit measures of neighborhood quality in these
regressions which are measures of school quality, neighbor quality, crime, air quality, location
in the central city and accessibility to the central city. In Table 2, we present results from
seven hedonic models.13 First, we compare rental hedonics (Models 1 and 2) with a house
price hedonic (Model 3). Second, we consider two ways of considering race in the rental
hedonic (Models 4 through 7).
11
 Santa Monica has rent control and is located in PUMA 6423. In order to control for these non-
market determined rents, we include a dummy variable for PUMA 6423.
12
 The American Housing Survey (AHS) provides much more extensive characteristics of the home
and neighborhood than the Census. Like the Census, the AHS metro files in recent years provide sub-
county geography (zones). However, the metropolitan surveys are small, providing very few
observations by zone. Examining household locations by race would yield very small samples by zone
with some zones having no observations. DiPasquale and Somerville (1995) estimate house price
hedonic models using the AHS metro files and provide a detailed description of the advantages and
disadvantages of the AHS. Given the focus of this paper on locational choice, the 1990 Census, with
its limited information on housing characteristics but large sample sub-county geography, is the better
data source.
13
 The six rental hedonics presented in Table 2 are estimated using OLS with the Huber correction
for the standard errors to account for neighborhood (PUMA) group effects. Using OLS without the
correction would understate the standard errors, therefore overstating the statistical significance of
many of the variables (Moulton (1986), Gyourko and Tracy (1991)).
17
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quite different from the PUMA boundaries. The city dummy variable is negative, but
statistically insignificant; the coefficient indicates that rents in the city are -2.2% lower than
rents outside the city. Overall, this model explains 32.9% of the variation in gross rents.
While there is clearly considerable variation that is not explained in this model, our six
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 Given that ozone exceedences increase considerably moving inland from the coast, we had some
concern that our air quality data may be serving as a proxy for temperature increases with respect to
increases in distance from the coast. Including average July temperature in our model did not
significantly change the air quality results but the correlation between July temperature and ozone is
roughly 0.6. In future research we will examine 1980 data when the Los Angeles ozone problem was
considerably worse.
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community attributes explain 80% of the variation in average rents across PUMAs.15
We were concerned that our results might be driven by the college graduate variable
which may be considered a proxy for household income. As a result, we drop this variable in
Model 2. Dropping college graduates decreases the adjusted R2 from 0.329 to 0.300 in the
rent equation. The largest impact of dropping this variable is on the coefficients on math
scores and the murder rate. The coefficient on math scores more than quadruples in size and
is statistically significant at the 5% level.16 The coefficient on murder nearly doubles in size
and becomes statistically significant. In addition, the coefficient on ozone is considerably
larger in Model 2. While the college graduate variable is important, it is not driving our
results.
Equation (9) could be estimated using home prices rather than rents. It could be
argued that home prices would be a better measure for our purposes since homeowners are
making a longer term location decision. The Census provides owner-reported values for
owner-occupied housing units, top-coded at $400,000. For some of the PUMAs in Los
Angeles county, the median of the price distribution is top-coded. As a result, we estimate a
house value hedonic in Model 3 using a tobit specification. The tobit model also assumes that
the error term is distributed iid; this assumption is violated in this case because of the presence
of PUMA group effects. Thus, maximum likelihood yields biased and inconsistent estimates.
15
 We ran a fixed effects model where our community attributes are replaced with PUMA dummy
variables. We then regressed the estimated community values from the coefficients on the dummy
variables on our six community attributes, which explained 80% of the variations in community value.
16
 As shown in Table 1, the correlation between PUMA math score and percent college graduate is
0.63.
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Consequently, the results in Model 3 must be interpreted with caution. The key finding in this
model is that all coefficients have the expected signs. The implicit price of college graduates
is considerably larger than in the rental equation. In communities with 10 percentage points
more college graduates, home values are 22% higher.17
For the rest of the analysis presented in this paper, we focus on renters rather than
homeowners. In our view, the benefits of analyzing renters outweigh the costs. We do
acknowledge that migrants who choose to buy a house are often making a more permanent
decision to locate in a community given the higher transaction costs associated with buying vs.
renting. Thus, there may be more information in their decision. However, in our sample
63% of renters have been in their units 2 years or longer. Certainly, neighborhood amenities
consumed even over a few years can have an impact on children. In addition, as discussed
above, the house price data are top-coded, which requires that we use a tobit estimation.
Given that the error term is not iid, the tobit yields both inconsistent and biased estimates.
Our goal is to look at expenditures on community attributes by race. In our data for Los
Angeles County, 40% of white households are renters while 61 % and 63% of black and
Hispanic households, respectively, rent. Finally, the focus of this paper is on community
investments in children. We expect that community attributes are more important for children
17
 Following Gyourko and Tracy (1991), we have experimented with including local tax variables
as an explanatory variable. Since PUMA definitions are not coterminous with political jurisdictions,
considering local government taxes or expenditures is not easy. However, the Census data provides
self-reported property taxes for each household. We calculated the mean of the ratio of taxes paid to
reported house value for each PUMA and included it as a regressor. Its coefficient was negative and
statistically significant; controlling for community quality attributes, PUMAs with higher tax rates have
cheaper homes.
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from lower income households since these households have fewer opportunities to supplement
poor community attributes with private goods such as tutoring. Lower income households
tend to rent rather than own their housing.
The hedonic models discussed thus far do not include any information on race.
Neighborhood racial composition is often used in hedonic estimations as a proxy for
neighborhood characteristics not explicitly measured. As we argued earlier, we take a stand
on the specific community attributes that matter in the location decisions of households and
explicitly measure those attributes. However, in Model 4 we add the racial composition of the
PUMAs (percentage white, black and Hispanic) to the specification in Model 1 to see the
impact of adding race to the model. The results indicate that there is a discount for living in
black and Hispanic areas but it is quite small. A ten percentage point increase in blacks
lowers rents by 3.0% while a 10 percentage point increase in Hispanics lowers rents by 1.8%.
Of the race variables, the coefficient on percentage black is statistically significant at the 5 %
level while the coefficients on percentage white and Hispanic are insignificant.18
It is often argued that minorities face different prices in the housing market than white
households due to discrimination. This suggests that minorities face different attribute prices
as well. Models 5, 6 and 7 in Table 2 estimate the rental hedonic separately for whites,
blacks, and Hispanics, respectively. Across the three models almost all the coefficients have
the same signs and many are similar in magnitude. However, there are some important
18
 As shown in Table 1, the high correlation between racial composition and some of the other
PUMA-specific variables such as percent college graduates, math scores and crime makes it difficult to
separate the effects of race from these other attributes.
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As shown in Table 3, community investment is a normal good. Richer people of all
races are more likely to move to the top ten communities. For blacks, we find that only 4.8%
of migrants who have incomes less than $20,000 move to a top ten PUMA while 23.1 % move
to a PUMA in the bottom ten. Black families with income greater than $40,000 are over three
times as likely (19.0%) to move to the top ten than poorer blacks and are much less likely to
live in the bottom ten (8.2%). For whites, we find that regardless of income, they are very
unlikely to locate in the ten worst communities. The probability of living in such a community
drops from 3.4% to 1.1 % as income rises. Whites are much more likely to live in a top ten
community; the poorest whites have a 25.0% probability of moving into the top ten, much
greater than the probability of the richest blacks or Hispanics moving into those communities.
Finally, Hispanic migrants are similar to black migrants in that they have a high probability of
moving into the worst areas (35.3%) at low incomes. Interestingly, as incomes grow over
$40,000, the probability of an Hispanic household living in the worst areas is still high at
25.9%. Like blacks and whites, Hispanic probabilities of moving into the top ten grow with
income, doubling from 5.1 % to 12.7% across the three income groups presented in Table 3.
We interpret these results as analogous to a multinomial logit model of locational
choice. A multinomial choice model simply predicts locational choice as a function of the
household characteristics. The tabulation of the Census data in Table 3 is a similar approach
using nonparametric methods. All racial groups show a demand for living in top ranked areas
assume that each family views Los Angeles as a single labor market. Thus, one's work opportunities
are independent of where one lives. When choosing among cities income is not exogenous to the
location decision. This part of our work builds on Kain and Quigley (1975) which examined household
consumption of housing and locational attributes by race and family type using a 1967 survey of 2,000
St. Louis households.
24
coast. As shown in Table 3, the city of Los Angeles has both very highly ranked communities
as well as the lowest ranked. Redondo Beach/Manhattan Beach is the top ranked PUMA
followed by Bel Air/West Hollywood. Watts is the bottom ranked PUMA followed by
Compton and Bell Gardens/Commerce. These estimates imply that a renter who moves from
the #1 ranked PUMA to the bottom ranked PUMA will be paid $710.79 a month compensation
for the decrease in quality of life.
Second Stage: Location Choice of Migrants
The Census provides the opportunity to examine locational choice by analyzing the
choices of households that actually moved in the last five years.21 As discussed earlier, recent
movers are the appropriate unit of analysis since they take community attributes as given and
face high moving costs which provide a strong incentive to choose the right location. 22
There is a literature that looks at locational choice based on the attributes of the mover
(e.g., Gabriel and Rosenthal (1989)). In Table 3, we use our quality of life estimates to find
the top ten and bottom ten communities (PUMAs) in the county. We then examine the Census
data on recent mover renters to characterize who chooses these PUMAs by race and income.23
21
 Using the data on recent movers, we are asking the question: given that a household has decided
to move how does the household decide among locations? This is preferred to analyzing the locations
of the stock of households since households may remain at a particular location for reasons that have
nothing to do with the attributes of the location. In this case, we would have to explicitly consider
those other reasons in order to isolate the impact of locational attributes, which would be a very
difficult task.
22
 Since only 36% of all households switched PUMAs between 1985 and 1990, we assume
that these movers take as given the attributes and prices of each location in the choice set.
23
 Our approach is similar to that taken in the inter-city quality of life literature. However, we use
these rankings to explore which socio-demographics groups choose the most neighborhood quality.
Unlike the inter-city literature, we can look at quality of life expenditures by income since we can
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slopes of the lines are quite flat indicating that the highest income black household never
reaches the community investment level of the lowest income whites.25 It is important to
remember that Figure 2 is generated using OLS which means that the lines in Figure 2 reflect
the average community expenditures by income and race. Average expenditures will be low if
large numbers of minority households live in poor quality communities. Re-examining Table
3, note that blacks move to the best communities as income rises but the absolute numbers of
blacks entering those communities is quite small; similarly, there are white households that
live in poor communities but again those numbers are small as well.
The gaps presented in Figure 2 raise the question of how expenditures vary by other
demographic groups. We examine expenditure differences by race, age, education and family
type for all recent mover renters. The results are presented in Table 4. The race results in
Table 4 mirror those in Figure 2. However, in Table 4, Hispanic households are
disaggregated into two groups: U.S. born and foreign immigrants. Foreign born Hispanics
spend considerably less than U.S. born on community quality of life. At $50,000 income,
U.S. born Hispanics spend $277 per month on quality of life while foreign born Hispanics
spend $203. While white expenditures decline consistently with age, the decrease is relatively
25
 One potential explanation for the low income elasticities in Figure 2 is unobserved community
heterogeneity. If minority communities feature greater unobserved variation in quality of life than
majority communities, then our Figure 2 underestimates the slope of the minority line. This would
mean that our methodology underestimates the size of the investment gap for poor people and
overestimates the gap for richer minorities. As discussed in footnote 20, we examined PUMA
heterogeneity using data on math scores from individual schools. Taking the residuals from the
regression of math scores on fixed effects, we generated the residuals and regressed the square of the
residuals on PUMA racial composition. There is not more variation in math scores within black
communities when compared to white communities which suggests that black communities are not more
heterogenous than white communities. This evidence does not support the measurement error
hypothesis.
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as their incomes grow, but clearly whites are more likely to live in highly ranked areas.
The income groups provided in Table 3 are broad, providing a rather crude measure of
the relationship between expenditures on community attributes and income. Consider the
income distribution of income by race for renters provided in Figure 1. While the black and
Hispanic income distributions are similar, whites clearly have significantly more income. We
can use our household data to explore more fully the relationship between community
expenditures and income. Since a major motivation for this work is that investment in
community (quality of life expenditures) can have significant impacts on the future prospects
of children, we estimate expenditures on quality of life by renters with children controlling for
income and race. These estimates are provided in Figure 2.24 The striking point in this figure
is that controlling for family income, whites consume a statistically significant higher amount
of quality of life than blacks or Hispanics. This gap is quite large; at $50,000 in income, we
find that whites spend $359.61 on community quality per month which is $108.7 more per
month than blacks and $152.2 more than Hispanics on average. Surprisingly, in Figure 2, the
24
 These estimates are calculated using the following regression equation:
QOL = 89.22 + 110.54 White + 9.55 Hisp + 4.06 Age - 0.046 Age2 + 19.31 Inc
(19.88) (10.64) (9.79) (0.962) (0.012) (3.83)
- 0.883 Inc2- 4.29 Wine - 15.85 HInc + 0.785 Wine2 + 1.05HInc2
(0.330) (4.25) (4.33) (0.344) (0.365)
N=7127 Adj R2=0.238
White and Hisp are race dummy variables, with blacks the omitted category. Wine and HInc are
interactions between race and income and QOL is quality of life expenditures. The data set used for
this analysis is white, black and Hispanic renters with children.
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slopes of the lines are quite flat indicating that the highest income black household never
reaches the community investment level of the lowest income whites.25 It is important to
remember that Figure 2 is generated using OLS which means that the lines in Figure 2 reflect
the average community expenditures by income and race. Average expenditures will be low if
large numbers of minority households live in poor quality communities. Re-examining Table
3, note that blacks move to the best communities as income rises but the absolute numbers of
blacks entering those communities is quite small; similarly, there are white households that
live in poor communities but again those numbers are small as well.
The gaps presented in Figure 2 raise the question of how expenditures vary by other
demographic groups. We examine expenditure differences by race, age, education and family
type for all recent mover renters. The results are presented in Table 4. The race results in
Table 4 mirror those in Figure 2. However, in Table 4, Hispanic households are
disaggregated into two groups: U.S. born and foreign immigrants. Foreign born Hispanics
spend considerably less than U.S. born on community quality of life. At $50,000 income,
U.S. born Hispanics spend $277 per month on quality of life while foreign born Hispanics
spend $203. While white expenditures decline consistently with age, the decrease is relatively
25
 One potential explanation for the low income elasticities in Figure 2 is unobserved community
heterogeneity. If minority communities feature greater unobserved variation in quality of life than
majority communities, then our Figure 2 underestimates the slope of the minority line. This would
mean that our methodology underestimates the size of the investment gap for poor people and
overestimates the gap for richer minorities. As discussed in footnote 20, we examined PUMA
heterogeneity using data on math scores from individual schools. Taking the residuals from the
regression of math scores on fixed effects, we generated the residuals and regressed the square of the
residuals on PUMA racial composition. There is not more variation in math scores within black
communities when compared to white communities which suggests that black communities are not more
heterogenous than white communities. This evidence does not support the measurement error
hypothesis.
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small over the life cycle. Stratifying by education, we find that non-college graduates spend
considerably less on quality of life for each racial group. At $50,000 income, black college
graduates spend $330 per month while blacks who have not graduated from college spend
$252. Among college graduates, whites spend considerably more at $448 a month while
Hispanics spend $317. Finally, Table 4 presents evidence on quality of life expenditure by
female headed households. We find that such households earning $50,000 per year spend less
than the average for all whites, blacks, and Hispanics. This evidence is inconsistent with the
claim that female heads would spend more on community to compensate for a missing parent.
Overall, our results indicate that income is not a sufficient statistic for quality of life
expenditures. The size and statistical significance of the gap is important to the extent that the
community attributes used in this analysis help to determine the future prospects of children
Why would a high income household choose a low quality of life area? Possible
explanations for this finding include housing market discrimination, differences in permanent
income and differences in preferences. The white/black consumption gap may indicate a lack
of opportunity in high quality areas for minorities. The results presented by Kain and Quigley
(1975) indicate differences in consumption by race which they attribute to housing market
discrimination. While there has been little research since on consumption differences by race,
there is considerable work suggesting that discrimination persists in U.S. housing markets
today (Yinger (1986), (1990), Turner (1992)). While there is no direct test for the existence
of discrimination in our work, the results from Table 2, Models 5 and 6, suggest that blacks
pay more for the total bundle of community attributes than whites. If blacks face higher
prices, then, even if expenditures are equal, blacks are consuming less than whites.
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An alternative argument could be that our results simply reflect differences in
permanent income between whites, blacks, and Hispanics. If quality of life is a normal good
and whites have higher permanent income, then we might expect to see that whites consume
more than other groups. The difficulty in testing this hypothesis is that the Census is a cross-
sectional data base with few proxies for lifetime income. Unlike researchers who have access
to a panel, we cannot even form a moving average of yearly income. However, we can test
this hypothesis by looking at consumption differences at different points in the life cycle.
We find that the white/black/Hispanic consumption gap persists across age and education
categories, indicating that there is more going on here than simply differences in permanent
income.26 The results presented in Table 4 for white households by age suggest that
community expenditures consistently decline with age. This result is inconsistent with the
standard life cycle model which suggests that expenditures should rise with age through mid-
life and then decline through old age. Our results in Table 4 also suggest that the gap in
expenditures between whites and minorities persists even when controlling for educational
attainment. In addition, if people base their quality of life consumption on permanent income
and whites have a higher transitory variance of income, then according to the permanent
income hypothesis we would expect to find that the white Engel curve has a flatter slope with
respect to current income than the black Engel curve. Our results do not show this pattern,
again suggesting that permanent income is not the full story.
26
 Researchers who have used panel data to study permanent income by race have found evidence
that is inconsistent with the claim that permanent income differences drive our results. Lillard and
Willis (1978) use the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics to study transitory components of income for
whites and blacks and find larger permanent and smaller transitory variances in log earnings among
blacks compared to whites (p. 992).
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A third explanation for our findings is that preferences vary among demographic
groups. For example, even as incomes rise, could minorities be committed to certain local
communities? As stated above, the results presented in Table 3 mimic a multinomial logit
model where locational choice is a function of household characteristics. This approach
simply quantifies which demographic groups choose each location. An alternative is to
estimate the high dimensional discrete choice problem using a standard conditional logit
framework discussed in Equation (12) (McFadden (1981)). The conditional logit represents
each of the 58 PUMAs as points in a 7-dimensional space: the 6 community amenities and a
quality-adjusted rent level. The quality-adjusted rental is generated from Model 1 of Table 2,
where we take the estimated hedonic coefficients to predict rentals in each community. Note
that in the conditional logit, the characteristics of the choice vary across choices but the
estimated coefficients are constant across the choices. Thus, this approach yields a 7-
dimensional vector that indicates a person's willingness to trade off rental reductions for
amenities based on observed migration data.27
Using data on recent mover renters with children under age 18, we estimate two
conditional logit models by race. These models are presented in Table 5. First, consider
Models 1 and 3 in Table 5. Note that the white and black coefficient estimates are roughly
similar. Holding community attributes constant, both groups prefer low rent areas. Both
blacks and whites exhibit a revealed preference for PUMAs with more college graduates,
higher math scores, lower murder rates, lower ozone levels, closer to the CBD, and outside
27
 We are assuming that households actually base their location decisions on the six specified
attributes.
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sign of the murder rate. As shown in Table 1, community racial characteristics are highly
correlated with our community attributes, which may present some difficulty in identifying the
separate effects of race and other community attributes in our models. Interestingly, the black
estimates are relatively robust to the inclusion of this gravity variable.
It is important to be cautious in drawing conclusions from these conditional logit
results. We evaluate these results in the context of all the evidence presented in this paper.
For example, the conditional logit results for white households could be interpreted as
indicating that for these households our community attributes simply proxy for racial
composition and that what white households really prefer are segregated neighborhoods.
However, the results presented in Table 2 indicate that the housing market pays only a small
discount of 3 % for moving into a neighborhood that experiences a 10 percentage point
increase in black share of the PUMA population. In addition, the evidence presented in Table
3 indicates that as migrant income rises, white migrants are less likely to live in the
communities ranked as the worst and more likely to move into areas that are ranked as the
best.
The standard interpretation of a conditional logit is that the results provide a measure
of revealed preference. We have estimated a pooled specification and performed a likelihood
ratio test and can reject at the 1 % significance level that coefficients are equal for different
racial groups, which means that these results suggest that preferences vary across racial
groups. However, these models assume that all individuals have equal access to all 58
communities, taking the price gradient as given. While the evidence presented in this paper
provides no explicit test for the existence of housing market discrimination in the Los Angeles
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U.S. born Hispanics. Looking at the data, we find that 81 % of Hispanic households that
moved in the last five years were foreign born and 26% lived outside of the U.S. five years
ago. There is an extensive history literature on the waves of immigration in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century that suggests that many immigrants moved to areas with significant
numbers of households from their ethnic group to take advantage of social networks or to be
with others who speak the same language. For Hispanics in our sample, our community
attributes may not fully capture important community differences. The presence of other
Hispanics who speak the same language and provide a social network may be very important
in their location decision. As a result, we re-estimated the conditional logit models adding the
percentage of PUMA residents that belong to the same racial group. We interpret this racial
stock variable as a "gravity" indicator attracting similar households to a location. These
results are presented in Models 2, 4, and 6 of Table 5.
The results for Hispanic households improve considerably with the addition of the
percent of the PUMA residents that are Hispanic. As expected, the sign on the coefficient of
that variable is positive, large, and statistically significant. The percent of PUMA residents
that are college graduates and the crime coefficients now have the right signs and all variables
are statistically significant. Models 2 and 4 of Table 5 indicate that the white coefficients are
much more sensitive to the inclusion of this gravity variable than the black estimates. For
both groups, the racial variable is highly statistically significant, suggesting that controlling for
other relevant community features, recent movers are more likely to choose communities
which feature a large stock of "similar" people. Note that for the whites the inclusion of this
variable reduces the statistical significance of several of the community attributes and flips the
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sign of the murder rate. As shown in Table 1, community racial characteristics are highly
correlated with our community attributes, which may present some difficulty in identifying the
separate effects of race and other community attributes in our models. Interestingly, the black
estimates are relatively robust to the inclusion of this gravity variable.
It is important to be cautious in drawing conclusions from these conditional logit
results. We evaluate these results in the context of all the evidence presented in this paper.
For example, the conditional logit results for white households could be interpreted as
indicating that for these households our community attributes simply proxy for racial
composition and that what white households really prefer are segregated neighborhoods.
However, the results presented in Table 2 indicate that the housing market pays only a small
discount of 3 % for moving into a neighborhood that experiences a 10 percentage point
increase in black share of the PUMA population. In addition, the evidence presented in Table
3 indicates that as migrant income rises, white migrants are less likely to live in the
communities ranked as the worst and more likely to move into areas that are ranked as the
best.
The standard interpretation of a conditional logit is that the results provide a measure
of revealed preference. We have estimated a pooled specification and performed a likelihood
ratio test and can reject at the 1 % significance level that coefficients are equal for different
racial groups, which means that these results suggest that preferences vary across racial
groups. However, these models assume that all individuals have equal access to all 58
communities, taking the price gradient as given. While the evidence presented in this paper
provides no explicit test for the existence of housing market discrimination in the Los Angeles
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County housing market, there is an extensive literature that suggests that there is not equal
access across all communities for minorities in American housing markets (Yinger (1986),
Turner (1992)). Without the assumption of equal access, we cannot infer differences in
preferences from the conditional logit results.
VI. Conclusions
Community choice is a very important household decision since it represents an
investment in community attributes that can have a significant impact on the quality of life of
all household members, particularly influencing the future prospects of children. The results
presented in this paper clearly show that investments in community vary substantially by race
even when controlling for income. Black and Hispanic households spend considerably less on
community than white households. The spending gaps estimated in this paper are large and
robust to different specifications. We believe that these results are important because they
indicate different levels of investments in attributes such as schools, safety, and neighbor
quality which can significantly impact the achievements of the next generation of minority and
majority households in our society.
What is far less clear in our results is why we find these differences in expenditures on
community attributes by race. Our results could reflect differences in permanent income, the
presence of housing market discrimination or differences in preferences by race. While we do
not have the data to perform an ideal test of the permanent income hypothesis, the evidence we
do have suggests that differences in permanent income do not explain fully the expenditure
gaps. In this analysis, we have no explicit test for barriers to accessing high quality
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communities for minorities but we do find evidence that minorities are paying higher prices for
community attributes which is consistent with the presence of discrimination. Our conditional
logit estimates, the standard test for preference differences, indicate that preferences for most
of our community attributes are close across racial groups. Regardless of the reason for the
gap, the size and persistence of the spending gap by race presented in this paper suggests that
there are real differences in consumption of community attributes.
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Map 4: Grade 8 Math Scores, 1989-90
282 to 350 (10)
263 to 282 (12)
233 to 263 (11)
221 to 233 (12)
• 176 to 221 (13)
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(1) All models except Model 3 are estimated using OLS with the Huber correction of standard errors Model 3 is estimated using the tobit specification
• indicates that the regression coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 10% level.
** indicates that the regression coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 5% level
o CDF for Black Renters
• CDF for Hispanic Renters
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* indicates that the regression coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 10% level.











Quality of Life Expenditures for Renters With Children
FIGURE 2
TABLE 4
















































































































































































































* indicates that the regression coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 10% level.
** indicates that the regression coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 5% level.
TABLE 5
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